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Abstract
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled in this survey year on two very
important cases arising from the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2012
opinion in Miller v. Alabama,1 which held unconstitutional the “sentencing
scheme[s] . . . mandat[ing] life in prison without [the] possibility of parole for
juvenile offenders.”2
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled in this survey year on two very 
important cases arising from the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2012 
opinion in Miller v. Alabama,1 which held unconstitutional the “sentencing 
scheme[s] . . . mandat[ing] life in prison without [the] possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders.”2  A series of Florida intermediate appellate court cases 
followed during this survey year, applying the Florida holdings as to Miller.3  
The Florida appellate courts continued to rule on a number of issues involving 
dependency and termination of parental rights (“TPR”), focusing in large part 
on rudimentary violations of procedural due process by the trial courts.4  In the 
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of
Law.  This Survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2014 through June 30, 
2015.  The author thanks research assistants Michael Costello, Andree Quaresima, and Samantha 
Scheff and Research and References Services Librarian, Rob Beharriell, for their assistance in 
writing this Survey. 
1. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2. Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 960 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 
2469); Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 394 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469). 
3. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 958; Horsley, 160 So. 3d 
at 394, 397. 
4. See Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 566, 569–70 
(Fla. 1991); Dep’t of Children & Families v. T.S., 154 So. 3d 1223, 1226 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2015). 
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delinquency area, restitution is a common dispositional alternative.5  There, the 
appellate courts have on a number of occasions been obligated to reverse trial 
court decisions for improperly applying the restitution statute.6 
Finally, and most importantly, the decades long shortcomings in the 
Florida dependency system—based in significant part on the lack of 
representation of children by lawyers, and the failure of Florida’s Guardian ad 
Litem (“GAL”) Program to both adequately and properly carry out its statutory 
role despite massive funding—have yet again remained a very serious problem 
during this survey year.7 
II. DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS 
In dependency proceedings, there must be competent and substantial 
evidence to form a basis for a finding of dependency.8  Thus, a mother’s 
homelessness and unemployment, standing alone, are insufficient to support a 
finding of prospective harm or neglect in a situation where the mother has not 
previously rejected services offered under Florida law, according to the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal in E.R. v. Department of Children & Families.9 
In N.J. v. Department of Children & Families (In re Interest of 
A.W.J.),10 the Second District Court of Appeal reversed a finding of dependency 
premised upon a head injury to a child.11  The only individual who testified at 
the adjudicatory hearing that the child’s head injury was the result of abuse was 
a medical doctor.12  However, first, the doctor was not asked whether she could 
provide her opinion within a reasonable degree of medical probability and, 
second, the doctor’s opinion of abuse was not substantiated by record evidence 
but was simply a subjective opinion, which was thus not legally sufficient to 
support the trial court’s adjudication of dependency.13 
                                                 
5. See L.W. v. State, 163 So. 3d 598, 599 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.D. v. 
State, 152 So. 3d 798, 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); C.W. v. State, 150 So. 3d 882, 883 (Fla. 
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
6. See FLA. STAT. § 985.437(2) (2014); L.W., 163 So. 3d at 601; A.D., 152 So. 
3d at 799; C.W., 150 So. 3d at 883. 
7. See Michael J. Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, 39 NOVA L. REV. 37, 62–
63 (2014) [hereinafter Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law]; Michael J. Dale & Louis M. 
Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights 
Proceedings in Florida:  The Issue Updated, 35 NOVA L. REV. 305, 310, 329–31 (2011) 
[hereinafter Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children]; infra Section V.B. 
8. J.A.B. v. State, 148 So. 3d 151, 151–52 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
9. 143 So. 3d 1131, 1133, 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  See generally 
FLA. STAT. ch. 39. 
10. 143 So. 3d 1109 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
11. Id. at 1110–11. 
12. Id. at 1111. 
13. Id. at 1111–12. 
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In Department of Children & Families v. T.S.,14 the intermediate 
appellate court reversed on a more fundamental ground.15  The Department and 
the child appealed the dismissal of a petition for dependency and arraignment, 
arguing that the trial court had committed a fundamental error violating a 
child’s due process rights by dismissing the petition without notice or an 
opportunity to be heard.16  Recognizing the basic due process violation 
involving notice and an opportunity to be heard, the appellate court reversed.17 
Case plans are an important part of dependency proceedings resulting, 
as they do, from the implementation of the federal Child Abuse Protection and 
Treatment Act, commonly known as CAPTA.18  In M.P. v. Department of 
Children & Families,19 the appellate court noted that generic case plans that do 
not relate to the individual needs and circumstances of the particular family are 
in violation of section 39.603 of the Florida Statutes.20  In the case at bar, there 
being no evidence of the father’s use of drugs, a case plan that ordered the 
father to submit to random drug screenings as part of the case plan constituted 
reversible error.21  A similar result occurred in M.B.W. v. Department of 
Children & Families (In re Interest of M.W.).22  In that dependency case, the 
Department conceded error in part as tasks were required beyond a parenting 
class, which had no relationship to the dependency as to the father.23 
The issue of nexus—the tie between a parent’s problem and risk of 
danger to the children—has perplexed the Florida dependency courts for almost 
twenty-five years since the Supreme Court of Florida decided Padgett v. 
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services24 in 1991.25  In E.H. v. 
Department of Children & Families,26 the appellate court affirmed the trial court 
finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
imminent abuse to a child in a dependency case.27  In E.H., there were incidents 
of domestic violence, unemployment with an eviction from the home, and a 
mother with a mental health issue that had gone untreated, which was 
responsible for her previous child being removed from her care after she heard 
                                                 
14. 154 So. 3d 1223 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
15. Id. at 1224. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 1226. 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 622 (2012). 
19. 159 So. 3d 341 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
20. Id. at 343–44; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.603(1)(f) (2014). 
21. M.P., 159 So. 3d at 344. 
22. 163 So. 3d 1229 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
23. Id. at 1229. 
24. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991). 
25. Id. at 570–71; Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 60–61. 
26. 147 So. 3d 616 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
27. Id. at 620–21. 
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voices encouraging her to shake that child.28  In E.H., the appellate court 
established that the mother’s failure to recognize her mood disorder and her lack 
of participation in services, along with multiple domestic violence incidents 
between the mother and the father where the mother continued to engage in the 
relationship with the father despite the parent-involved nature of their 
relationship, constituted evidence of a substantial risk of imminent abuse to the 
child.29 
An important technical procedural issue was before the First District 
Court of Appeal in W.W. v. Guardian ad Litem Program.30  The issue was 
whether an order entered on a post-dependency motion seeking relief fully 
resolving the issues that were raised in the motion is reviewed by appeal rather 
than writ.31  Applying a recent amendment to Rule 9.130(a)(4) of the Florida 
Rules of Appellate Procedure,32 the appellate court concluded that orders 
entered on post-dependency motions seeking relief that fully resolve the issues 
raised in the motion are to be viewed as final orders under the appellate rule.33 
Cases involving immigrant children are becoming more commonplace 
in the Florida dependency courts as a result of the influx of such children 
nationally.34  In In re Y.V.,35 a private petition for dependency was filed on 
behalf of a minor “living in Florida after illegally emigrating alone from 
Honduras.”36  The petition was dismissed by the trial court because the harm 
relating to the dependency took place outside of Florida, and “the court viewed 
the petition as an attempt to circumvent federal immigration law[].”37  The 
appellate court reversed, finding that there was jurisdiction and that Florida 
                                                 
28. Id. at 617. 
29. Id. at 620–21; see also W.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 137 So. 3d 
1078, 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that substantial evidence of harm to one child 
alone was not sufficient evidence to find substantial risk of imminent abuse to another child); 
E.M.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 795 So. 2d 183, 187 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
(finding that a substantial risk of harm can be met without past acts of harm where a mental 
illness is the type that would impact the parent’s “judgment and ability to perform basic daily 
caretaking tasks”). 
30. 159 So. 3d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
31. Id. 
32. In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 2014 WL 
5714099, at *7–8 (Fla. Nov. 6, 2014) (specifying the amendment to Rule 9.130(a)(4)). 
33. Id.; W.W., 159 So. 3d at 1000–01. 
34. See, e.g., WENDI J. ADELSON, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS IN 
FLORIDA: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND CHILD ADVOCATES 5, 7 (2007), 
http://media.law.miami.edu/clinics/children-and-youth/pdf/2007/special-immigrant-juvenile-
manual-2007.pdf. 
35. 160 So. 3d 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
36. Id. at 577. 
37. Id. 
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dependency law applies.38  Although the appellate court reversed, it did note 
that “the trial court [was] not alone in its misgivings about the use of the 
dependency [proceedings] as a conduit to achiev[e] a favorable immigration 
status.”39  The appellate court also pointed to two provisions in chapter 39 of the 
Florida Statutes that applied to this child:  abandonment, abuse or neglect by the 
parent and having no parent capable of providing supervision and care.40  The 
appellate court then noted that the only reason the child was not in imminent 
risk of injury was because there is a responsible adult caring for the child on a 
voluntary basis.41 
Domestic violence can be the source of dependency court jurisdiction.42 
 Issues of domestic violence can also arise in the context of petitions to protect 
and against domestic violence pursuant to section 741.30 of the Florida 
Statutes.43  In Hair v. Hair,44 the appellate court reversed and remanded the trial 
court’s decision with instructions to vacate a final judgment of injunction for 
protection.45  The appellate court found that the petitioner did not possess 
“sufficient evidence that she was a victim of domestic violence or was in 
imminent danger [to become] a victim” as provided in the Florida Statutes.46  
Specifically, it found that the daughter did not wish to see or interact with her 
mother and that was not a basis for the issuance of a domestic violence 
restraining order.47 
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Under Florida law, the petitioner must prove: first, that there are 
statutory grounds for termination of parental rights; second, that termination is 
in the “manifest best interest of the child;” and third, that termination is the least 
restrictive means to protect the child from serious harm.48  In B.K. v. 
Department of Children & Families,49 the appellate court addressed the 
application of the three standards in a case in which the father was 
                                                 
38. Id. at 581. 
39. Id. at 579, 581. 
40. In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 578; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(a), (e) (2014). 
41. In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 579. 
42. See Michael J. Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, 33 NOVA L. REV. 
357, 357 (2009). 
43. FLA. STAT. § 741.30. 
44. 159 So. 3d 984 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
45. Id. at 986. 
46. Id. at 985; see also FLA. STAT. § 741.30. 
47. Hair, 159 So. 3d at 985. 
48. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.806, .810; Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 
So. 2d 565, 570–71 (Fla. 1991). 
49. 166 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
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incarcerated.50  Under Florida law, the substantive standard regarding 
incarceration is that the incarceration be for a significant portion of the child’s 
life.51  In B.K., the father was scheduled for release after nearly eight and a half 
years of the child’s life.52  Here, the father would be “incarcerated for nearly 
fifty percent of [the child’s] minority” at the point the father is to be released 
from prison.53  The child had also been in foster care for a period of time, and 
“at the time of trial, the child was nearly six years old.”54  On the question of 
manifest best interest, the trial court found no bond with the child, no relative 
placement and that the child did not know who her father was.55  Finally, the 
trial court found and the appellate court agreed based upon clear and convincing 
evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child.56  Citing that 
termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the child, the appellate 
court noted that merely sending letters and cards to a child is not enough 
because “then it would be difficult indeed to terminate the rights of any parent 
incarcerated for a lengthy period of time, regardless of the child’s lack of a real 
relationship with her parent.  This [would] leave the child without any 
[parenting] at all, which would not be in her best interest.”57  The appellate court 
thus affirmed.58 
On the other hand, in D.S. v. Department of Children & Families,59 the 
court reversed a finding of termination of parental rights arising out of a father’s 
incarceration.60  In D.S., “[i]n percentage terms, the father’s incarceration 
amount[ed] to approximately 27[%] to 33[%] of the children’s minorit[y].”61  In 
doing so, the appellate court cited B.C. v. Florida Department of Children & 
Families,62 in which the Supreme Court of Florida held that the percentages in 
D.S. would “not constitute a substantial portion of the children’s minorit[y].”63  
While terminating the parental rights of the father to one of the three children, 
                                                 
50. Id. at 873. 
51. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(d)(1). 
52. B.K., 166 So. 3d at 873. 
53. Id. at 874. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 872. 
56. Id. at 872–73.  “[T]he State must show by clear and convincing evidence that 
reunification with the parent poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child. . . . [and 
that] termination of those rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious 
harm.”  Padgett v. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991). 
57. B.K., 166 So. 3d at 877. 
58. Id. 
59. 164 So. 3d 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
60. Id. at 36. 
61. Id. at 34. 
62. 887 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2004). 
63. Id. at 1054–55; D.S., 164 So. 3d at 34. 
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the court did not find termination as to the other two.64  Those children were in a 
stable home, not in the custody of the Department, and the father maintained a 
close relationship, given the father’s incarceration, with the children.65  
Specifically, they knew who their father was and had “regular interaction with 
him, [which included] regular phone calls, letters, and visits.”66  At the time of 
his release, the children would be eleven and six.67  Because they were with 
relatives and still had contact with their father, and there being no evidence of 
harm to the children, termination was not the least restrictive means to prevent 
harm, and the appellate court reversed.68 
Whether termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of 
protecting the child from harm, the third question before the trial court in any 
termination of parental rights case, was on appeal in two separate cases during 
this reporting cycle.69  In A.H. v. Department of Children & Families,70 a parent 
appealed termination of her parental rights as to her son on the ground that 
termination was not the least restrictive means of protecting the child from 
harm.71  The State conceded error on this point.72  The appellate court reviewed 
the record in which the trial court created a permanent guardianship for the 
child.73  However, “there [was] no evidence that the mother’s irregular 
contact[s]” caused harm to the child, although there was evidence “that the child 
had a strong bond with the permanent guardian and was doing . . . well” there, 
the child “also enjoyed his visits with [his] mother and his siblings and [wanted] 
to maintain a relationship with them.”74  Under those circumstances, termination 
of parental rights was not the least restrictive means of protecting the child from 
harm.75  Interestingly, the GAL program apparently did not concede error.76  
The GAL program, although the record does not reflect whether the individual 
was qualified as an expert, testified that the parents were not “‘bonded to [the 
child] at all. . . . Emotionally and mentally it would be devastating to take him 
                                                 
64. D.S., 164 So. 3d at 34–36. 
65. Id. at 35. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 36. 
69. See C.D. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 164 So. 3d 40, 41 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 144 So. 3d 662, 664 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014). 
70. 144 So. 3d 662 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
71. Id. at 664. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 664, 666. 
74. Id. at 666. 
75. A.H., 144 So. 3d at 666. 
76. Id. at 665. 
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out of his home [with the permanent guardian].’”77  On the basis of this opinion, 
“[t]he GAL recommended termination of parental rights [based on] the . . . best 
interests of the child so [that] he could receive permanency through adoption.”78 
 By reversing, the appellate court rejected this lay opinion.79  In fact, contrary to 
what occurred in this case, the GAL guidelines state that guardians ad litem 
shall not offer expert opinions.80 
In C.D. v. Florida Department of Children & Families,81 the appellate 
court reversed in part on the basis of the trial court’s misinterpretation of A.H.82 
 The appellate court held that first, the trial court ruling was in error because it 
was at odds with its own factual finding that the children did have a bond with 
their parents, and second, the trial court misconstrued age, which the “court held 
that TPR [could be] the least restrictive means of protecting a child from harm 
despite the fact that there was little or no bond between the child and [the 
parent].”83 
Here, again, the appellate court rejected the opinion of the GAL who 
argued that TPR was the least restrictive means of preventing harm to the 
children.84  The appellate court held that the GAL’s opinion on appeal was 
“diametrically opposed to the position it took below in which it argued that the 
children would not be harmed by TPR because their aunt would allow them to 
have contact with the [m]other.”85 
The interplay of rights of putative fathers and termination of parental 
rights based upon abandonment was before the Fourth District in A.S. v. 
Department of Children & Families.86  The father, whose paternity was 
established approximately a year after the child was born, appealed from a 
termination of parental rights adjudication.87  The mother had played a 
nonexistent role in the child’s life and termination had been entered against 
her.88  The father did not know that he was the parent of the child until a 
                                                 
77. Id. (alterations in original). 
78. Id. 
79. See id. at 666. 
80. See A.H., 144 So. 3d at 664–65; FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, 
FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS 9 (2015), 
http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Standards_Final_2015.pdf 
[hereinafter 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS]. 
81. 164 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
82. Id. at 43–44; see also A.H., 144 So. 3d at 666. 
83. C.D., 164 So. 3d at 43–44. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 44. 
86. 162 So. 3d 335, 336–37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
87. Id. at 337. 
88. Id. at 336. 
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paternity test was taken a year after the child was born.89  Even then, he did not 
learn that he was the father for another approximately four months.90  Once it 
was determined that he was the father, he began taking “steps to begin forming 
a relationship with [the child].”91  Despite this, the trial court entered an order 
terminating the father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment.92  The 
appellate court recognized that the definition of parent “does not include . . . an 
alleged or prospective parent unless the parental status falls within the terms of 
[section] 39.503(1) or [section] 63.062(1).”93  Because the Department of 
Children and Families (“DCF”) failed to utilize the proper provisions of chapter 
39 of the Florida Statutes to locate the father and because the court could only 
consider whether the father abandoned the child once the father’s paternity was 
established, the trial court erroneously relied upon the failure to take affirmative 
steps to establish paternity prior to that time.94  The appellate court held that the 
trial court was not presented with clear and convincing evidence of 
abandonment.95  And finally, the appellate court held that the father “was never 
offered a case plan despite [the fact that there was] no indication in the record 
that he was unable to comply with [it].”96  On these bases, the appellate court 
reversed.97 
Periodically, cases appear concerning the proper procedures for appeals 
in child welfare cases.98  R.W. v. Department of Children & Families99 involved 
the question of whether “the trial court erred in denying [a] post-judgment 
motion to set aside the surrender” of parental rights for lack of jurisdiction.100  
In R.W., an expedited petition was filed by DCF to terminate the mother’s 
parental rights to her child where the mother had executed a sworn consent to 
surrender those rights.101  However, after receiving the order, the mother filed a 
motion claiming “that the judgment was inconsistent with the trial court’s oral 
ruling on the mother’s visitation rights pending adoption of the child.  The trial 
court denied the motion, and the mother thereafter timely filed a notice of 
                                                 
89. Id. at 337. 
90. Id. 
91. A.S., 162 So. 3d at 337. 
92. Id. at 337–38; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(1), 39.503(1), 63.062(1) (2014). 
93. A.S., 162 So. 3d at 338 (first alteration in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 
39.01(49)); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 39.503(1), 63.062(1). 
94. FLA. STAT. § 39.803(8); A.S., 162 So. 3d at 339. 
95. A.S., 162 So. 3d at 339. 
96. Id. at 340. 
97. Id. 
98. See, e.g., R.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 164 So. 3d 15, 17–18 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
99. 164 So. 3d 15 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
100. Id. at 16. 
101. Id. 
9
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appeal.”102  However, “[p]rior to filing her initial brief, the mother filed a 
motion asking [the appellate] court to ‘relinquish partial jurisdiction [so that] the 
trial court’” could consider the mother’s motion for reconsideration.103  The 
appellate court viewed the motion as one for relief from judgment and granted 
the motion, relinquishing jurisdiction.104  After an evidentiary hearing, “the trial 
court . . . entered an order denying the motion for reconsideration.”105  The 
mother did not file a notice of appeal challenging that order but instead filed a 
status report to the appellate court.106  The appellate court entered the filing and 
instructed the mother to have her initial brief filed.107  Because “the mother did 
not file a notice of appeal seeking review of the order denying her motion for 
reconsideration,” the court on appeal refused to interpret the status report as a 
notice of appeal.108  Having “relinquished jurisdiction [for] the trial court to rule 
on the motion for reconsideration” in the absence of an appeal from the order on 
the motion for relief in judgment, the appellate court had no preserved issue 
before it and thus, affirmed the final judgment terminating the mother’s parental 
rights.109 
IV. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
On March 19, 2015, the Supreme Court of Florida decided two cases 
involving application of the Supreme Court of the United States’ opinions in 
Graham v. Florida110 and Miller.111  In Graham, the Supreme Court of the 
United States ruled that the Eighth Amendment does not allow a juvenile 
defendant to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for non-homicide 
crimes.112  In Miller, the Supreme Court of the United States held that juveniles 
are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing based upon 
their diminished capacity and greater prospects for reform, and it held that the 
Eighth Amendment forbids the courts from sentencing juveniles to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole in capital cases.113 
                                                 
102. Id. at 17. 
103. Id. 
104. R.W., 164 So. 3d at 17–18. 
105. Id. at 17. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See id. at 18. 
109. R.W., 164 So. 3d at 18. 
110. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
111. See id. at 82; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2475 (2012); Falcon 
v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 956, 959–60, 963–64 (Fla. 2015); Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 394, 
405–06, 409 (Fla. 2015). 
112. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74, 82; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
113. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 2474–75; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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Two Supreme Court of Florida cases followed the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ rulings.114  In Falcon v. State,115 the Supreme Court of Florida 
held that Miller should be read retroactively.116  In Horsley v. State,117 the 
Supreme Court of Florida held that the remedy in terms of a sentencing option 
in order to comply with Miller does not require revival of the Florida statute 
regarding life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.118 
The Horsley case involved post-Miller and Graham convictions of 
juveniles as adults based upon the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
conclusion that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that 
mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile 
offenders.”119  The Supreme Court of Florida rejected the doctrine of statutory 
revival, which had been argued by the State.120  The State took the position that 
the only possible sentencing options to comply with Miller were life without 
parole or the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.121  The Supreme Court 
of Florida concluded that the recent change in the Florida Statute was effective 
on July 1, 2014, and should apply to those juvenile offenders whose sentences 
were for crimes committed prior to July 1, 2014, but after Miller and 
Graham.122  The Florida Statute from 2014 governed those who did the killing 
and those who did not actually kill or attempt to kill.123  The Legislature then 
added a detailed value process in the same statute.124 
In Falcon, the Supreme Court of Florida undertook an analysis of 
whether Miller should be applied retroactively to juveniles who were convicted 
of capital offenses prior to the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in 
that case.125  The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that Miller should be given 
retroactive effect based upon its retroactivity test set forth in Witt v. State.126  
The Court relied upon the principle set out in Witt, finding that Miller 
                                                 
114. See Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 955, 959, 964; Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 394, 397, 
408–09. 
115. 162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015). 
116. Id. at 956, 963–64; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
117. 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015). 
118. Id. at 395, 409; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(b)(2)(a) (2014); Miller, 132 
S. Ct. at 2475. 
119. Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 394 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. VIII; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 2475; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 82 
(2010). 
120. Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 395. 
121. Id.; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
122. See Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 394–95, 406, 408–09. 
123. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1); see also Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 406. 
124. Act effective July 1, 2014, ch. 2014-220, § 7, 2014 Fla. Laws 2869, 2876–77. 
125. Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 955 (Fla. 2015); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
126. 387 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1980); Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 956; see also Miller, 
132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
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constitutes a “development of fundamental significance and therefore, must be 
given retroactive effect.”127 
The issue of retroactivity under Miller initially was to be before the 
Supreme Court of the United States this term in a pair of cases, State v. 
Montgomery128 and State v. Toca.129  Although the Supreme Court of the United 
States granted a writ of certiorari in both cases, Montgomery was the only case 
heard due to the procedural issues that resulted in the dismissal of Toca.130  
Montgomery had been in prison for nearly fifty years after a guilty without 
capital punishment verdict was returned by the jury.131  This verdict 
automatically imposed a life sentence without possibility of parole.132  
Montgomery sought collateral relief from the State of Louisiana for his 
conviction, arguing that Miller should retroactively apply to his sentence 
because of the automatic life sentence without parole that was attached to his 
conviction.133  The trial court denied his motion and the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana denied his writ because the court had previously held that Miller did 
not retroactively apply.134  However, the Supreme Court of the United States 
held in Montgomery that Miller does retroactively apply because the rule 
established in Miller was “a new substantive rule of constitutional law.”135  New 
substantive rules “alter[] the range of conduct or the class of persons that the 
law punishes” and must apply retroactively.136  The Court found that although 
the rule in Miller was substantive, an individual affected by it is afforded the 
procedural opportunity to demonstrate that he or she belongs to the given 
protected class.137  Given the Supreme Court holding in Montgomery, the 
decision in Falcon, holding that Miller applied retroactively will be upheld.138 
This Survey has repeatedly discussed restitution as one of a number of 
dispositional alternatives in delinquency cases in addition to commitment, 
probation, community service, revocation of driver’s license and attendance at 
                                                 
127. Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 956 (quoting Witt, 387 So. 2d at 931); see also Miller, 
132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
128. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), rev’g 141 So. 3d 264 (La. 2014). 
129. 141 So. 3d 265 (La. 2014). 
130. Toca v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015) (dismissing certiorari). 
131. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725–26. 
132. Id. at 726. 
133. Id. at 726–27. 
134. Id. at 727. 
135. Id. at 732–35. 
136. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 
353 (2004)). 
137. Id. at 735. 
138. See Montgomery, slip op. at 14; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Falcon v. State, 
162 So. 3d 954, 956 (Fla. 2015). 
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school.139  Despite what would appear to be a statute clear on its face, this past 
year the appellate courts dealt with seven separate cases involving the 
restitution provision provided in section 985.437 of the Florida Statutes.140  In 
J.A.B. v. State,141 the child appealed a $460 restitution award.142  “At the 
restitution hearing, the victim stated that . . . it would cost between $460 and 
$490 to repair the damage to [the] vehicle” while giving no basis for his 
opinion.143  No document was introduced demonstrating the actual repair cost.144 
 Thus, as “the award was not supported by competent [and] substantial 
evidence,” the appellate court reversed.145 
In K.R. v. State,146 a child appealed from a $479 restitution adjudication 
arising out of the theft of an automobile.147  Because the victim simply testified 
that the amount “was like [$479] plus like there would be no tax,” and there was 
no further evidence, the court on appeal reversed based upon the speculative 
amount testified to by the victim.148 
In S.M. v. State,149 the juvenile had been ordered to pay $8629 in 
restitution arising out of the theft of an automobile.150  The appellate court 
affirmed on the grounds that the victim of the automobile expressed an opinion 
as to the value of the automobile basing the opinion on information obtained 
from a website, such as the Kelley Blue Book.151  However, in so ruling, the 
appellate court held that taking judicial notice of an online Kelley Blue Book 
evaluation, although it did not occur in this case, would not comply with the 
Florida Rules of Evidence.152  The appellate court explained that there needed to 
be evidentiary demonstration that the Kelley Blue Book website had the “level 
                                                 
139. FLA. STAT. § 985.455(1)–(2) (2014); Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, 
supra note 7, at 53. 
140. K.R. v. State, 155 So. 3d 507, 509 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015); L.W. v. 
State, 163 So. 3d 598, 599–601 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2015); S.M. v. State, 159 So. 3d 966, 967–
68 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.D. v. State, 152 So. 3d 798, 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014); C.W. v. State, 150 So. 3d 882, 883 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); J.A.B. v. State, 148 So. 
3d 151, 151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); M.K. v. State, 143 So. 3d 428, 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.437(1)–(2). 
141. 148 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
142. Id. at 151. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 151–52. 
146. 155 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
147. Id. at 508–09. 
148. Id. 
149. 159 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
150. Id. at 967. 
151. Id. at 967, 969. 
152. S.M., 159 So. 3d at 967, 969; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.202(12) (2014). 
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of accuracy [contradicted] with that of a court-recognized appraiser” or was 
“relied upon by a high percentage of car traders.”153 
A case involving both the competence of a victim to testify to the value 
of stolen goods and the failure of the State to demonstrate that the value of the 
stolen goods reached the statutory minimum was before the Fourth District in 
M.K. v. State.154  In this delinquency case, the respondent appealed the order 
finding him guilty of first-degree petty theft, arguing that there was no 
competent evidence of the value of the stolen necklace so that the respondent 
could be charged with third-degree grand theft, which required that the property 
be “valued at $300 or more [or] . . . less than $5,000.”155  Because the twelve-
year-old victim could not provide competent evidence as to the value of the 
stolen necklace and that the victim was not competent to testify as to the value 
required, the appellate court reversed.156  Specifically, “because the necklace 
was a gift, the victim was unable to testify [as] to [the] . . . purchase price or 
replacement cost beyond” testifying as to what the victim was told by a parent 
based upon research on the Internet.157 
Two cases, C.W. v. State158 and L.W. v. State,159 dealt with the question 
of whether the court could properly enter an order of restitution in a 
delinquency case where the respondent was not present.160  In the C.W. case, the 
court ordered $664 in restitution at the rate of $25 per month.161  However, the 
respondent was not present and the court failed to find that the child had the 
ability to pay.162  Because the child was not present and there was no showing 
that the child had waived his presence, the court reversed.163  However, in L.W., 
where the child was ordered to pay $321.61 in $30 monthly installments based 
upon a damaged window, the court found at first the child had waived his right 
to attend, as the lawyer withdrew his objection based upon the child not being 
present.164  However, the trial court failed to make the requisite factual findings 
of the child’s or the family’s ability to make payments of $30 per month.165 
                                                 
153. S.M., 159 So. 3d at 967. 
154. 143 So. 3d 428, 430–31 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
155. Id. at 430; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.014(3)(c)(1). 
156. M.K., 143 So. 3d at 431–32. 
157. Id. at 431. 
158. 150 So. 3d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
159. 163 So. 3d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
160. Id. at 599; C.W., 150 So. 3d at 883. 
161. C.W., 150 So. 3d at 883. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. L.W., 163 So. 3d at 599–600. 
165. Id. at 601. 
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In A.D. v. State,166 the trial court entered a restitution order regarding a 
camera even though there was no reference to it “as an item stolen in the grand 
theft count contained in [the] . . . petition for delinquency.”167  On that simple 
basis, the court held that the trial court lacks the authority to require restitution, 
as the only restitution allowable is that of which arises out of the offense 
charged as reflected in the information or factual basis for the plea.168 
In a delinquency case, it is not unusual for the State to be unable to 
serve a respondentalleged delinquentwith a summons to appear.169  In State 
v. C.W.,170 the State appealed a trial court final order entered sua sponte, 
dismissing the petition in a delinquency case for failure to serve.171  The 
appellate court ruled quite simply that the trial court improperly ruled on an 
issue that was not before it and that it interfered with the State’s discretion to 
bring charges against the child.172  However, oddly, because the State had not 
preserved the argument for appeal, the appellate court dismissedalbeit, 
writing to emphasize that where no motion to dismiss had been filed by the 
child, the trial court was without authority to dismiss the prosecution sua 
sponte.173 
Discovery is an important matter in delinquency and adult criminal 
cases often reaching constitutional dimensions.174  In M.H. v. State,175 a child 
appealed from an order that withheld “adjudication of delinquency and 
impos[ed] probation for [the] burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and [petty] 
theft.”176  The claim on appeal was a discovery violation in which the State 
listed the victim of the charged offenses as a Category B witness rather than a 
Category A witness under Florida law.177  As a result, the trial court failed to 
hold a Richardson Hearing.178  Failure to conduct a hearing under the facts of 
the case constituted reversible error.179 
The question of a proper search and seizure, in the context of a child 
who was not in school and thus a possible truant, was before the Fourth District 
                                                 
166. 152 So. 3d 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
167. Id. at 798. 
168. Id. at 798–99. 
169. See State v. C.W., 166 So. 3d 950, 950 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
170. 166 So. 3d 950 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
171. Id. at 950. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 773, 777 (Fla. 1971). 
175. 151 So. 3d 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
176. Id. at 33. 
177. Id. 
178. Id.; see also Richardson, 246 So. 2d at 773–77. 
179. M.H., 151 So. 3d at 37. 
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in J.R. v. State.180  The child was found guilty of possession of marijuana after 
the trial court denied the child’s motion to suppress.181  The police officer had 
initially observed the child from the officer’s patrol car on a school day at about 
8:15am.182  In reversing the denial of the child’s motion to suppress, the 
appellate court held that the officer had begun the stop for truancy without 
reasonable grounds to believe that the child was absent from school.183  
Florida’s status offense statute does not authorize a police officer to 
preemptively detain a child who may be plotting to skip school later.184  The 
appellate court thus reversed, upholding the motion to suppress.185 
Florida’s method for determining whether a juvenile charged with an 
act of delinquency should be held in secure detention is determined on the basis 
of something known in Florida as the Risk Assessment Instrument (“RAI”).186  
In A.M. v. State,187 a juvenile filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking 
release from secure detention because his offense was improperly determined to 
be a violent third-degree felony.188  The trial court found that a robbery by 
sudden snatching of a cell phone qualified as a violent third-degree felony, 
which raised A.M.’s RAI to the level of secure detention.189  The Third District 
Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s finding and held that the proper 
designation of robbery by snatching under the facts of the case was a non-
violent third degree felony, which would have resulted in a lesser RAI 
determination.190  In D.L. v. State,191 a juvenile filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus on the basis that the court incorrectly scored the RAI by double scoring 
possession of a firearm and failing to address whether an unrelated felony 
charge was concurrently pending against the child.192  The Fifth District Court 
of Appeal reversed, finding as it had in other appeals that it is improper to 
include three additional points for possession of a firearm where the possession 
is already given the maximum ten points for the third degree felony charge 
under Florida law.193 
                                                 
180. 149 So. 3d 1196, 1196 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 1197–98. 
184. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 984.13(1)(b) (2014). 
185. J.R., 149 So. 3d at 1198. 
186. FLA. STAT. § 985.255(3)(a). 
187. 147 So. 3d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
188. Id. at 99. 
189. Id. at 99–100. 
190. Id. at 101–02; FLA. STAT. § 812.131. 
191. 147 So. 3d 653 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
192. Id. at 654. 
193. Id. at 655; see also M.W. v. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 15 So. 3d 782, 783–84 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
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V. OTHER MATTERS 
A. Due Process Shortcomings in the Dependency Court 
It is clear beyond peradventure that basic due process rights apply in 
dependency and termination of parental rights cases.194  Nonetheless, repeated 
failures to comply with the basic due process constitutional protections arise in 
the dependency court in Florida and, most recently, cases in Miami demonstrate 
this shortcoming.195  First, in R.C. v. Department of Children & Family 
Services,196 a termination of parental rights case, a parent sought “certiorari 
relief from a sua sponte order of the trial court [obligating the mother] to submit 
to a pregnancy test.”197  The appellate court quashed the trial court order due to 
the complete failure to accord the mother notice and because there was also no 
showing of good cause as applied by law.198  In so doing, after quoting at length 
from the trial court proceeding and describing it as being “patently obvious 
from the record in this case that the trial [court] acted for reasons of its own 
rather than any rule of law,” the appellate court concluded by citing to 
Alexander Hamilton.199  “As Alexander Hamilton long ago warned us, ‘it can be 
of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may 
substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the 
legislature.”200  The appellate court then added “[t]he principle bears an 
occasional reiteration, even—and perhaps especially—[with]in our children’s 
court.  There was no pretense made of following any legislative directives or 
intentions in this case.”201 
A second Miami case is R.W. v. Department of Children & Families.202 
 In that case, in a short opinion, the appellate court reversed on the grounds that 
the same trial court’s termination of parental rights decision was based upon a 
determination that continued involvement of the father in the family relationship 
“threaten[ed] the safety or well-being of the child[ren] [regardless] of 
                                                 
194. FLA. STAT. § 984.01(1)(a); Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, 
at 45; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
195. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; A.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 147 
So. 3d 621, 622–23 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); R.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 150 
So. 3d 1277, 1279–80 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); R.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 147 
So. 3d 631, 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
196. 150 So. 3d 1277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
197. Id. at 1277. 
198. Id. at 1279–80. 
199. Id. 
200. R.C., 150 So. 3d at 1280 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 452–53 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2009)). 
201. Id. 
202. 147 So. 3d 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
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services.”203  However, the amended petition did not allege such a statutory 
basis but pleaded only abandonment, and thus, the appellate court reversed.204 
The third Miami case is A.A. v. Department of Children & Families.205  
Here, the appellate court reversed because the mother was denied due process as 
a result of the same trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing before 
denying her motion for modification.206  In that case, there was a combined 
failurefirst, to hold an evidentiary hearing and then, to make a written factual 
finding addressing the requisite factors enumerated in the statute.207  Those 
failures constituted a basic violation of due process rights.208  These cases 
follow on the heels of earlier appellate court rulings reversing the same trial 
court in Miami for its failure to comply with basic constitutional principles in 
G.W. v. Department of Children & Families209 and F.M. v. State Department of 
Children & Families.210 
B. The Ongoing Failure to Provide Counsel for Children in Child Welfare 
Cases in Florida and Shortcomings in the GAL Program 
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Florida held in In re D.B.211 that children 
are not entitled to counsel in termination of parental rights cases.212  Until July 
of 2014, the only way that children received counsel in dependency and 
termination of parental rights cases in Florida was through volunteer lawyer 
appointments or in several counties legal aid representation.213  Thus, while all 
parties to these cases were represented by counsel—DCF, the parents, and the 
GAL Program—the only unrepresented party was the child unless a volunteer 
attorney or legal aid lawyer took the child’s case.214  The GAL Program’s role, 
                                                 
203. Id. at 632. 
204. Id. 
205. 147 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
206. Id. at 622, 624. 
207. Id. at 623; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10) (2014). 
208. A.A., 147 So. 3d at 622–23. 
209. 92 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
210. 95 So. 3d 378, 381–82 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); G.W., 92 So. 3d at 309–
10; see also Michael J. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, 38 NOVA L. REV. 81, 86–87 (2013) 
[hereinafter Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law].  The same trial court was reversed in R.L.R. v. 
State, a case in which the trial court had held that chapter 39 somehow preempted the Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar on the confidentiality of the lawyer child client relationship.  116 So. 
3d 570, 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also FLA. STAT. ch. 39. 
211. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980). 
212. Id. at 91. 
213. Id. at 92. 
214. Id. at 87–88, 92–93. 
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as discussed below, is not to represent the child as a lawyer would do but to 
represent the child’s best interests.215 
During its 2014 session, the Legislature passed a statute authorizing the 
expenditure of $5 million to pay for lawyers to act as attorneys ad litem to 
represent children before the dependency court in five categories of cases that 
are based upon the children’s special needs.216  The serious shortcomings in the 
statute are detailed in last year’s survey article, including the ethical issues 
relating to the roles of the GAL Program and DCF and their attorneys in 
requesting the appointment of and choosing the lawyers for the five categories 
of children.217  The problem with the law is exacerbated by the fact that literally 
hundreds of other children with serious physical, mental, and educational 
problems do not have the right to counsel because they do not fit within the five 
categories of the statute as determined by these possibly opposing parties.218 
In 2014, the General Counsel for the GAL Program prepared a 
document titled Children with Certain Special Needs Attorney Registry that 
directly illustrates the underlying problems that arise when applying the 2014 
amendment to section 39.01305 of the Florida Statutes.219  First, the document 
states that “[t]he appointing court is required to consult with the GAL [Program] 
in attempting to locate a pro bono attorney.  If a pro bono attorney cannot be 
located or a recommendation is not provided with[in] [fifteen] days, the court is 
authorized to appoint compensated counsel.”220  A 2011 study demonstrates the 
inability of the Florida Bar to provide pro bono lawyers to children in 
dependency proceedings,221 thus making it both futile and time consuming to 
locate pro bono attorneys and necessitating the use of compensated attorney 
                                                 
215. Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 63; Michael J. Dale & 
Louis M. Reidenberg, The Kids Aren’t Alright:  Every Child Should Have an Attorney in Child 
Welfare Proceedings in Florida, 36 NOVA L. REV. 345, 352–53 (2012) [hereinafter Dale & 
Reidenberg, The Kids Aren’t Alright]. 
216. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3)(a)–(e); see also Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, 
supra note 7, at 62. 
217. Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 61–63; see also Dale & 
Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 330; Dale & Reidenberg, The Kids 
Aren’t Alright, supra note 215, at 353. 
218. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3)(a)–(e). 
219. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305; DENNIS MOORE, GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, 
CHILDREN WITH CERTAIN SPECIAL NEEDS ATTORNEY REGISTRY (2014), available at 
http://www.slideplayer.com/slide/4327595. 
220. MOORE, supra note 219. 
221. See UNIV. OF FLA. & FLORIDA’S CHILDREN FIRST, LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF 
DEPENDENT CHILDREN: A 2012 REPORT ON FLORIDA’S PATCHWORK SYSTEM 2–4 (2012), 
https://www.law.ufl.edu/_pdf/academics/centers-clinics/centers/legal-rep-of-dep-children-12.pdf 
(demonstrating the Bar’s inability to provide a substantial number of pro bono lawyers for 
children in dependency cases). 
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representation.222  Second, according to the document prepared by the GAL 
General Counsel, it is possible to be registered to represent children for a fee in 
dependency cases even if the attorney has never actually handled such a case.223 
 The attorney merely needs to demonstrate one of the following prerequisites set 
out in the document:  that the attorney has “observed at least thirty hours of 
hearings in dependency cases including at least one shelter hearingone 
dependency adjudicatory hearing, one judicial review hearing, one hearing 
pursuant to rule 8.350 [of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure] and one 
termination of parental rights trial.”224  Contrary to this prerequisite, attorneys 
for children “must have the requisite skill and competence to represent children 
in [these complex] cases that involve, among other matters,” a variety of federal 
statutory rights as well as myriad, medical, psychological, educational, 
“cultural, racial, moral, and religious issues.”225 
A review of the application of the 2014 amendment to section 39.01305 
of the Florida Statutes in its first year demonstrates additional ongoing problems 
with the law, leaving aside the issues of the attorney qualifications necessary to 
handle these cases and the ethical issues of the GAL Program’s role in choosing 
the lawyers for children as a separate party in the proceeding.226  First, during 
the first fifteen months of operation, only 1236 children were appointed counsel 
with an expenditure of $900,000 out of a budget of $5 million, leaving $4.1 
million unspent.227  Unfortunately, this data does not distinguish between 
volunteer and paid lawyers.228  As explained above, the Florida law requires an 
attempt to find volunteers before hiring a lawyer.229  Yet, during the initial 
fifteen-month period, more than twenty-eight thousand children were before the 
dependency court.230  Second, the appointment of lawyers for children varied 
dramatically among the circuits with no correlation to their population.231  In the 
                                                 
222. See id. 
223. MOORE, supra note 219. 
224. Id.; see also FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.350. 
225. Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 351. 
226. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 (2014). 
227. JUSTICE ADMIN. COMM’N, APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 
39.01305, F.S.: COUNT BY CIRCUIT AND CASE DESCRIPTION, APPOINTED JULY 1, 2014–SEPTEMBER 
21, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S.] (data on 
file with author); JUSTICE ADMIN. COMM’N, PAYMENTS ON SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 
39.01305, F.S.: COURT APPOINTED BY CIRCUIT AND APPROPRIATION FISCAL YEAR, JULY 1, 2014–
SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter COSTS PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 
39.01305, F.S.] (data on file with author); Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 62. 
228. See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227; 
COSTS PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227. 
229. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(4)(a). 
230. FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  
NOVEMBER 2014 (Dec. 2014) [hereinafter GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  NOVEMBER 2014]. 
231. See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227. 
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Sixth Circuit—Pasco and Pinellas Counties—with a population of 1.4 million, 
there were 254 paid appointments of attorneys ad litem at a cost of $199,000.232 
 In the Seventeenth Circuit—Broward County—with a population of 1.8 
million, there were 37 appointments at a cost of $25,000.233  In the Thirteenth 
Circuit—Hillsborough County—with a population of 1.3 million, there were 
138 appointments at a cost of $106,000.234  In the Eleventh Circuit—Miami-
Dade County—with a population of 2.6 million, 130 lawyers were appointed at 
a cost of $57,000.235  These statistics do not account for the appointment of pro 
bono lawyers who under the 2014 statute are to be assigned first and found by 
the GAL Program.236  Nor does it account for the availability of legal aid 
lawyers to represent some of these children in some of the circuits.237  However, 
the population differences among the circuit courts raises the question of why 
the process of paid appointments differs so dramatically from circuit to 
circuit.238 
The historical role of the GAL Program is also problematic for reasons 
unrelated to the 2014 amendment to section 39.010305 of the Florida 
Statutes.239  First, data produced during this survey year as well as recent reports 
                                                 
232. Id.; JUSTICE ADMIN. COMM’N, PAYMENTS ON SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT 
TO S. 39.01305, F.S.: COURT APPOINTED BY CIRCUIT AND APPROPRIATION FISCAL YEAR, JULY 1, 
2014–SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES 
PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S.] (data on file with author); State & County Quickfacts: Pasco 
County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12101.html (last revised 
Dec. 2, 2015); State & County Quickfacts: Pinellas County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12103.html (last revised Dec. 2, 2015). 
233. APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227; 
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232; 
State & County Quickfacts: Broward County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12011.html (last revised Dec. 2, 2015). 
234. APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227; 
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232; 
Total Population in Hillsborough County Zip Codes, TAMPA HILLSBOROUGH ECON. DEV. CORP., 
http://www.tampaedc.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Hillsborough-County-Population-by-
ZIP-Code.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2016). 
235. APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227; 
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232; 
Miami-Dade County, SOUTHFLORIDAFINDS.COM, 
http://www.southfloridafinds.com/county/miami-dade (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).  
236. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 (2014); APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 
39.01305, F.S., supra note 227. 
237. See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227; 
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232. 
238. See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227; 
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232. 
239. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305; Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for 
Children, supra note 7, at 330. 
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from the GAL Program demonstrate ongoing serious flaws in the program.240  
First, the budget of the GAL Program now exceeds forty-two million dollars not 
including federal funds and in-kind services.241  Yet, the GAL Program was 
only able to represent approximately 76%242 of the children before the 
dependency court in 2014, despite employing more than 145 attorneys, 
including an appeals unit.243  It is hard to be certain of the accuracy of these 
figures because the Statewide GAL Program—Performance Advocacy 
Snapshot—only provides percentages.244  Thus, it would appear that as of June 
2015, the court appointed the GAL Program to 84.3% of the children in 
dependency proceedings.245  Of the 84.3%, 77.5% had an Active Certified 
Volunteer.246  Thus, it would appear that 65.3% of the children before the 
dependency court last June had an active certified GAL volunteer.247  One 
cannot tell from the GAL website whether the remaining 34.7% of the children 
had GAL best interest representation or if they were simply left with nothing.248 
 A recent announcement from the GAL Program in Palm Beach County seeking 
donations stated that it could only represent the best interests of about 800 of 
the 1200—66%—children before the dependency court in that Circuit.249  In 
                                                 
240. See FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  
MAY 2015 (June 2015) [hereinafter GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  MAY 2015]; GAL 
REPRESENTATION REPORT:  NOVEMBER 2014, supra note 230; FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, 
GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  MAY 2014 (June 2014) [hereinafter GAL REPRESENTATION 
REPORT:  MAY 2014].  GAL are the lowest paid state attorneys, and the amount of cases they take 
exceeds the American Bar Association’s recommended number, according to a study authorized 
and paid for by the GAL Program.  FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
ATTORNEY COMPENSATION ANALYSIS 3 (June 30, 2014), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/GAL-Attorney-Compensation-Study-Final-Version.pdf.  One might 
surmise the study was prepared and paid for to a Florida based company for fundraising purposes. 
 See id.  Significantly, the lawyers at the Offices of Regional Counsel, albeit without a study to 
support their problems, are also paid at low salaries with caseloads far exceeding professional 
norms.  See id. at 15–16. 
241. Justice Administrative Commission: Guardian ad Litem Program, FLA. OFF. 
PROGRAM POL’Y ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, 
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/profiles/1016 (last updated June 11, 2015). 
242. GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  NOVEMBER 2014, supra note 230. 
243. Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency 
Proceedings, supra note 7, at 330. 
244. Statewide Guardian ad Litem Program — Performance Advocacy SnapShot 
(PASS), GUARDIANADLITEM.ORG (June 2015), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/GAL-SnapShot-June-2015.pdf. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. See id. 
248. See id. 
249. Michelle Piasecki, Nonprofit to Help Kids in Need Is Restarted, PALM BEACH 
POST, Dec. 4, 2014, at N4. 
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Broward County, matters appear to be worse.250  A June 2015 report from the 
GAL Program stated that the GAL Program was appointed for 82.23% of the 
children before the dependency court, and 56.06% of those children received a 
volunteer GAL.251  Thus, less than half of the children in Broward County had a 
GAL Program representative.252 
Second, the GAL Program seems to be confused about its proper role or 
continues to choose to misstate it.253  The GAL Program in Florida is under the 
supervision of a state agency in the executive branch that is statutorily 
authorized to collect and provide information to the court when appointed by 
the court as to what in certain limited situations it believes is in the best interest 
of the children.254  It does not represent the child as an attorney does, although 
its literature at times says it does.255  GAL volunteers and paid staff may not 
practice law, as is the case with any other non-lawyer.256  Thus, they may not 
provide legal advice to the child, just as the GAL Program lawyers may not, 
leaving no confidential relationship between any GAL representative and the 
child.257 
Third, GALs cannot provide expert opinions to the court, although as 
the case law discussed earlier in this survey demonstrates, they have done so.258 
 The guidelines for the GAL Program, however, are disingenuous in this 
regard.259  They state 
“[v]olunteers are not being used as experts in a case and will testify 
as lay people, however this does not take away the fact that they may 
be credentialed and should be permitted to identify themselves as 
                                                 
 250. See GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:  MAY 2015, supra note 240. 
251. Id. 
252. See id. 
253. See Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 
330. 
254. FLA. STAT. § 39.8296 (2014); FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM, IMAGINING THE 
FUTURE:  35TH ANNIVERSARY 1980–2015 7, 15–17 (2015), 
http://www.issuu.com/liz338/docs/annual_report-web. 
255. Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 330. 
256. FLA. STAT. § 61.403(7); see also Volunteer FAQ, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD 
LITEM PROGRAM, http://www.guardianadlitem.org/faq (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
257. STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, STANDARDS OF OPERATION 15 
(2006), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/StandardsOfOperation.pdf 
[hereinafter STANDARDS OF OPERATION]; see also 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM 
STANDARDS, supra note 80 at 19. 
258. See A.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 144 So. 3d 662, 665 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014). 
259. See 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80, 
at 9. 
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such [and] . . . [t]he court report should not reiterate their credentials 
to bolster their credibility.”260 
The simple outstanding question—as any lawyer would immediately 
recognize—is:  What is the relevance of the credential, if not to add to the 
credibility of the witness and thus bolster the witness’ testimony?261 
Finally, the confusion in the operation of the GAL Program is only 
exacerbated by its articulation of the role of its lawyers.262  Despite calls by this 
author in this Article and in other articles for the GAL Program to properly state 
the role of its lawyers—to represent the GAL Program—it does not do so.263  It 
continues to conflate its role with that of the attorney who actually represents 
the legal interest of the child.264  For example, the Dependency Practice 
Manual, apparently written by GAL Program special counsel, in the 
introduction states that “[i]t is hoped that attorneys will use this manual to 
ensure that children are the focus of dependency proceedings, that their voices 
are heard, and that their legal interests [are] protected through proactive legal 
advocacy.”265  That statement defines the role of a child’s lawyer.266  It does not 
define the role of a GAL lawyer whose sole ethical obligation is to represent his 
or her client, which is the GAL Program.267  To do otherwise would violate the 
Florida Rules of Professional Responsibility.268  The GAL guidelines as 
redrafted this year only makes matters worse.  They refer once again to the 
“Child’s Best Interest Attorney” and describe the role as “the attorney employed 
by the [department] to protect [the] child’s best interest either in the circuit 
dependency courts or the appellate courts.  There is no attorney-client 
relationship between the CBI attorney and the child; however, representing the 
best interest of the child is the sole purpose of their advocacy.”269  This 
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statement can only be described as legal nonsense.270  The GAL Program lawyer 
represents the GAL Program, a statutory party in a dependency case.271  It is 
impossible for a lawyer to represent an idea.  The GAL Program literature 
describes a form of legal representation that simply does not exist.272  
Attempting to apply these GAL guidelines is inconsistent with the law and 
defies logic.273 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Florida decided two major cases this survey 
year.274  First, it set forth the procedure for applying the Supreme Court of the 
United States holdings in Graham and Miller that rendered life without parole 
unconstitutional as applied to juveniles who committed capital and non-capital 
offenses.275  Second, it held that Miller should apply retroactively.276 
The Florida intermediate appellate courts were active in deciding 
delinquency matters primarily involving proper application of restitution 
standards.277  The appellate courts were also busy implementing the Horsley 
decision, which set out the test for how to determine the proper sentence for a 
juvenile previously incarcerated for life without parole.278  In the dependency 
and TPR areas, the issue of proper application of the nexus problem was once 
again before the appellate courts.279  Another common issue involved the 
dependency court rights of immigrant children.280  Also, a pattern of failure to 
comply with basic due process rights of parents in child welfare cases appears to 
be developing in the juvenile court in Miami as this survey and surveys over the 
past two years have illustrated.281 
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Finally, all children in Florida should be entitled to counsel in 
dependency and TPR proceedings.282  The 2014 amendment to section 39.01305 
of the Florida Statutes, giving some children some lawyers in some cases access 
to counsel, is grossly inadequate.283  The GAL Program, with a budget in excess 
of forty-two million dollars, consistently and without restraint, mistakes its role 
to the detriment of the children.284  The establishment of consistent guidelines 
across the board is crucial in providing adequate legal representation that 
children not only need, but deserve, in all juvenile proceedings, whether dealing 
with delinquency, TPR, or dependency.285 
282. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 (2014); supra Section V.B. 
283. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3); supra Section V.B. 
284. See supra Section V.B. 
285. See supra Parts II–V. 
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